An Introduction to Philosophy, by Jacques Maritain

I’ve been working through this volume, little by little, for quite some time now, and I finally finished during my lunch break today. I say “finished”; what I mean is, I’ve read the whole book. I’ve no doubt that I’ll return to it again in the future, as I certainly haven’t absorbed all Maritain has to say.

Maritain’s book is, as the title suggests, an introduction to philosophy; but the book is by no means a survey of the history of philosophical thought.
Maritain was a follower of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, and this is an introduction done from an explicitly Thomistic point of view. It is, in fact, an introduction to Thomism; other schools of philosophy (other than the Greek predecessors of Plato and Aristotle, who are described in some detail) are mentioned only in discussions of the errors avoided by Aristotle and Aquinas.

If you’re looking for a broad overview of philosophical thought, consequently, this is not the book for you. On the other hand, reading such a broad overview is often like reading a movie review by a reviewer who doesn’t reveal his biases. For my money, give me an author who tells me what he thinks is true, and why he thinks it is true. I might not agree with him, but I’ll learn more from him that way. Maritain is this kind of author.

And, of course, as my current goal is to learn more about Thomism, this is exactly the kind of book I was looking for.

Next up is a book recommended by the no-longer-anonymous James Chastek at Just Thomism, Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy, by A.D. Sertillanges, OP. The book is out-of-print, but I managed to find a copy at Amazon.

Speaking of which, another advantage of the Kindle: I was able to buy a nice Kindle edition of the Blackfriars translation of the Summa Theologiae for just a few books; the print edition is five big volumes and costs around $150, if I recall correctly. I can carry my copy around with me in its entirety–and it’s searchable. Woohoo!

What did He know, and when did He know it

Some exegetes are fond of playing the game “What did Jesus know, and when did He know it.” One place I’ve often seen this is Mark 7:24–30, in which a non-Jewish woman comes to Jesus asking for help for her daughter. Jesus explains that he has been sent to the Jews and asks, shockingly, if he should throw what is holy to dogs? The woman says that even dogs get to eat the crumbs that fall from their master’s table, after which Jesus commends her for her faith, and does what she asks.

Some exegetes take this as a learning experience for Jesus. He thought he was called only to the Jews; but here a foreign woman talks him around, and shows him something new. Now, this is clearly nonsense. Jesus is the Son of God–the Second Person of the Trinity–incarnate. He knew very clearly who he was, and what he was doing. God is the grand author, whose manuscript is history, and I think it’s fair to say that He staged the whole incident for our benefit.

The Fifth Joyful Mystery is the occasion when Jesus, as a young lad of twelve, goes missing for three days and is found, finally, in the Temple, bemusing the priests and scribes with his precocity. And personally, I’ve always found “mystery” to be the right tag. Why was it, alone of the incidents of Jesus’ youth, included in the Gospel? I think I’ve got a piece of the answer, and it has to do with the matter I mentioned above, and with today’s feast day, that of Mary, Mother of God.

Today’s feast was instituted as the result of a controversy in the early church. Mary had long been called the “Mother of God”; but Nestorius said that this title was invalid: Mary, a human being, could not possibly be the mother of the Second Person of the Trinity. Eventually this was resolved by a doctrined called, impressively, the Hypostatic Union: that Jesus Christ was one person possessed of two natures: a fully divine nature, that of the Second Person of the Trinity, and a fully human nature. The key phrase here is “one person”. Mary was undeniably the mother of Jesus’ human nature; and as Jesus is one person, fully God and fully Man, it is reasonable to call here the Mother of God.

In short, Jesus is not simply a good man, touch in some special way by the Diety. Nor was Jesus’ body a sort of mask worn by God. Jesus is God Incarnate, true God and true Man. And that’s why it makes no sense to play the game of “What did Jesus know and when did He know it?” He was God. As an adult, He knew certainly knew what he was about. But on the other hand, surely His human nature was capable of learning, and indeed needed to learn? In his human nature, he surely wasn’t possessed of the secrets of the universe as an infant lying in a manger. In human terms, he certainly did need to come to terms with who He was, to grow into Himself, as it were.

And this is precisely the importance of the day when Mary and Joseph found Jesus in the Temple, and He asked them, in wonder, “Did you not know that I would be in my Father’s house?” It was obvious to Him; the surprise was (and this shows His humanity) that it wasn’t obvious to Mary and Joseph. Even then, as a boy of twelve, He knew His Father in heaven, and was about His Father’s work.

Heresy Doesn’t Develop

Here’s a nifty post from a blog I’d not seen before, Army of Martyrs.

It’s a commonplace of Roman Catholic theology that doctrine develops: that as time goes by and questions arise, new doctrines arise that answer the questions while remaining consistent with what was known before. Sometimes development is simply drawing out the implications of what is stated explicitly in Scripture; other times, it’s more like discovering that Newtonian physics is a special, approximate case of Einsteinian physics: there’s more going on than we realized. But either way, developed doctrine cannot contradict what went before.

The blogger at Army of Martyrs points out that heresy does not develop in the same way: being error, you can’t build a large structure on it that will stand of its own. Interesting thought.

The Ethics of September 11th

One statement of ethics I used to hear all the time is “If it feels good, do it!” I haven’t heard it recently, but I think that’s because our culture has internalized it so thoroughly that it goes without saying. I mention it because it highlights a basic principle of the human will: in any action a person takes, he is pursuing an end that seems good to him. And, ultimately, there must be some real good there. We do evil by pursuing some good in the wrong way, or at the wrong time, or in the wrong state, or out of due proportion. It’s not wrong to have enough money to live comfortably; but it’s wrong to steal it. It’s not wrong to have sex; but it’s wrong to have sex outside of marriage. It’s not wrong to eat ice cream; but it’s wrong to binge on it. It’s not wrong to talk; but it’s wrong to gossip. It’s not wrong to play poker on-line; but it’s wrong to do it on company time, or with the rent check. It’s wrong…but it seems good to us, it feels good, and we do it. And there’s just enough genuine goodness there that we can fool ourselves into thinking that it’s OK, despite the protests of our conscience.

Sin makes you stupid, as Mark Shea would say, and I often think that our sense of due proportion is the first thing to go. And the more the conscience is ignored, the more it is deadened, and the more it is deadened, the less a sense of due proportion we have.

So the men who flew the planes into the Twin Towers were pursuing an end that seemed good to them. Ultimately, there is some real good they were after, though I won’t presume to say what it was. But they had persuaded themselves that that tiny spark of true worth outweighed the enormous villainy of their means.

It felt good to them, and they did it.

How deeply wrong they were.

Orphans of Chaos, by John C. Wright

It just occurred to me that I haven’t written about John C. Wright’s “Chronicles of Chaos” trilogy, which I read over the summer and quite thoroughly enjoyed. The titles are Orphans of Chaos, Fugitives of Chaos, and Titans of Chaos, and the contents of the titles is an interesting mix of fantasy, mythology, and epistemology, the latter used in a delightfully odd way.

The premise is (apparently) straightforward: there are five orphans, three boys and two girls, living in a boarding school/orphanage in England. The time is the present. They have lived there, all together, for (almost) as a long as any of them can remember. The conditions are reasonably good: they are fed well, clothed well, and educated well, in a surprisingly classical vein. But they are not generally allowed TV or movies or modern novels, and they not allowed to leave the grounds except on rare occasions under strict supervision. As they are approaching adulthood, naturally they chafe under these restrictions.

Oh, and each of them has a strange power. Our heroine, for example, though not obviously muscular, can carry absurdly heavy weights without difficulty.

Who are these orphans? Why are they being kept here? Who is running the orphanage? And what does epistemology have to do with any of this? There’s more below the fold–but be watch for the spoiler warning.

To summarize, though: it’s a neat adventure, Wright does some new and interesting things, the characters are compelling, and I look forward to reading more by him. The only complaint I have is a certain juvenile fascination with sex on the part of the five principles–not a lot of actual sex, mind you, and none on stage, but a fair amount of thinking and talking about it. Of course, the principles are juveniles….

Anyway, good stuff.

Mild Spoiler Warning: If you’re already planning on reading these, you might want to stop here.

I’m going to try to explain what I found so charming, philosophically, about the books, without giving too much away.

Although each of the five orphans appears human, each is really a member of a different supernatural race, each with its own powers, and there’s a complicated rock-paper-scissors scheme whereby the powers of each race can be blocked by those of one of the others; this provides much of the plot. But the neat thing is that each set of powers comes with an appropriate philosophy/epistemology.

One character, for example, can manipulate matter at the atomic level. He can open locks, he can modify machines, he can create “serums” with a profound affect on the behavior of other people. He’s basically a walking nanotech lab. And going along with this is a purely naturalist epistemology. People are essentially machines. There is no super-natural. Everything that is can be manipulated in fundamental ways at the atomic level. That’s the way the character thinks, and that is, in fact, how his power works.

Another character has the power of dreams. He can make things happen just by wanting them to happen strongly enough. Philosophically, he is, I guess you’d say, an Idealist: the real world doesn’t really exist. All is fluid; all can be whatever you want it to be.

In short, the world-views of the five clash just as their powers clash–yet they must learn to work together to survive. Yet they cannot abandon their world-views; they are part of each character’s nature, and one of the means by which they exercise their powers.

Philosophically speaking, this is of course nonsense: there are five philosophies on offer, here, and they can’t all be true. Nor can any of the characters (except possibly the Idealist) truly accept the powers of the others without rejecting the philosophy that underlies their own. In that sense, I guess you’d say that pragmatism (and friendship) wins the day.

Nevertheless, good fun, and a nifty mix of deep thought and occasionally frivolous behavior.

Philosophy 101 by Socrates, by Peter Kreeft

I picked up this book the other day because I was enjoying Kreeft’s Socrates Meets Descartes, and this appeared to be in the same vein. In fact, it is, and it isn’t. It’s written at a similar level and for a similar audience, but the style is entirely different.

Whereas Socrates Meets Descartes is a dialog written by Kreeft and involving Socrates, this present book is a commentary on Plato’s Apology. Socrates offended a lot of people, and was brought up on charges of atheism, among other things; the Apology describes his defense, and his condemnation to death. Kreeft also provides selections from Plato’s Euthyphro, to show why Socrates was on trial, and from the Phaedo, to show how Socrates died, with additional commentary on both.

As a commentary, it’s both enlightening and entertaining, and Kreeft’s love of both the topic and of philosophizing in general is infectious. I enjoyed it, and recommend it. However, I have one minor quibble with the cover blurb, which makes it appear that the book stands alone. It really does not; although Kreeft quotes liberally from the Apology, I found that I really needed to dig up a copy of the Apology and read it straight through before going on with Kreeft’s commentary. That’s the right thing to do, anyway, but the blurb should have made it clear that this is a companion to Plato, and does not contain the complete text.

Incidentally, Kreeft uses W.H.D. Rouse’s translation of the Apology; I found the complete text, using the same translation, in Great Dialogs of Plato, published by Signet Classics.

Socrates Meets Descartes, by Peter Kreeft

I picked up this book as the result of several intersecting strands of thought. First, thanks to my interest in Thomas Aquinas I’ve been delving into things philosophical. Second, I’ve become familiar with Peter Kreeft from his writings on Catholicism. Third, I’ve long held a kind of an intellectual grudge with respect to René Descartes. Descartes is generally known as the “Father of Modern Philosophy”; and the really new and radical element in his philosophy is doubt: doubt of the things that are as plain as the existence of the floor under my feet. In my view, to begin by doubting objective reality makes as much sense as having yourself hogtied before commencing a wrestling match. That many philosophers have followed Descartes down this garden path is simply proof of C.S. Lewis’ observation in The Magician’s Nephew: the trouble with trying to make yourself stupider than you are is that you very often succeed.

Consequently, I snagged this book when by chance I came across it: for I thought I might learn something, that I would be entertained, and that the author was trustworthy. On the former two points I was amply satisfied; on the latter I am satisfied as well, but with a qualification.

Kreeft’s book is a dialog between Socrates and Descartes in which Socrates cross-examines Descartes about the content of his book, the Discourse on Method. As such, it’s one of a series by Kreeft; apparently Socrates has previously met Marx, Machiavelli, and Sartres, and I gather he’s going to meet Kant in the future.

I’ve occasionally run across books in which a fictional interviewer questions great figures of the past, and they respond with bits from their written works. This is something different. The conceit is that Descartes has met Socrates in the Afterlife–in Purgatory, to be precise–and that as part of his purgation he must attempt to defend his philosophical work against Socrates’ questioning. It works quite well, for the most part, though I think that Kreeft gets a little too cute with it here and there.

But here’s the qualification I need to make: Socrates isn’t really Socrates–not Plato’s Socrates. The Socrates we know is primarily a literary conceit adopted by Plato as a way to convey his own philosophical ideas. The manner and philosophical style of the fictional Socrates is no doubt descriptive of the real man, and no doubt many of the ideas presented originated with him as well–Socrates was Plato’s teacher, after all. But just as Plato’s Socrates is Plato’s mouthpiece, so Kreeft’s Socrates is Kreeft’s mouthpiece. This book isn’t a meeting between Descartes and Socrates as Plato presented him. Kreeft’s Socrates has clearly been doing a deal of studying since he died; he’s familiar with the history of the world, both politically and intellectually, from his day to ours, and he not infrequently argues from an Aristotelian and Thomistic point of view rather than from a Platonic or even Neo-Platonic point of view.

I’ve no real problem with this; I picked up the book rather hoping that this is just what he would do. But a reader unfamiliar with Kreeft’s work would reasonably expect (given the cover blurb) to find Descartes being cross-examined by Plato’s Socrates rather than Kreeft’s. That said, it’s hard to know how any author, however pure his motives, could have achieved that; and at least the basis for Kreeft’s criticism of Descartes is right out there in plain sight.

And of what does that criticism consist? I don’t feel able to state that in any pithy or authoritative way; I’m still very much a newbie at thinking about these things. In part, though, “Socrates” shows that despite his avowed policy of “universal doubt”, Descartes actually assumes quite a bit more than he thinks he does (including the ability to reason logically) and that a certain amount of circular reasoning in involved in his attempts to safeguard reason and objective reality. Descartes comes across as a brash young man, brilliant but a little too ready to assume that the beauty of his conclusions validates the argument by which he reached them.

Pleasingly, Socrates leaves Descartes with his contemporary Blaise Pascal, with the hint that Pascal possesses what Descartes lacks. This is pleasing because, due to Julie D‘s recommendation some while back, Kreeft’s edition of Pascal’s Pensées, was in eyeshot at the
time.